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The measurement of the recovery rate helps to determine the value of bonds for
going concerns. The value of a bond is the present value of the future payments,
so a biased estimation of the recovery rate will bias pricing of bonds after, but also
before, a default. If the recovery rate is biased, it can in°uence the post default
returns if the bond price corrects to its intrinsic value. I study the potential bias
using time series tests.
There are reasons to believe that trading is imperfect for defaulted bonds and that
recovery rates might be depressed. First, some of the empirically noted results for
non-defaulted bonds can survive (liquidity, default risk, and interest rate risk), or
even be exacerbated by a default. Second, the market for defaulted securities can
exhibit information asymmetries.
The pricing of non-defaulted corporate bonds is in°uenced by liquidity. Ericsson
& Reneby (2003) ¯nd that bond spreads incorporate a substantial liquidity com-
ponent in addition to the default risk. The less liquid a bond is in the study of
Chen et al. (2005) the higher the yield spread, and De Jong & Driessen (2005) ¯nd
that liquidity is a priced factor in a multi-factor model. If corporate bond prices
are sensitive to liquidity before default, there is no reason to think that they are
less sensitive after default. The systematic part of the default risk is priced (see
Weinstein (1981), Berndt et al. (2006) or Thorsell (2008)). If the market beta is a
measure of the default risk, it can be expected to increase after default. The co-
variation with the market return is higher when the asset is closer to being equity.
The interest rate risk is ignored here, since it is not likely a major contributor to
the risk of a defaulted corporate bond.
In a default situation for a company there are new reasons for trading the securities.
Some investors, such as pension funds and insurance companies, are not allowed
to hold high risk assets. Other investors specialize in this type of high risk assets.
This specialization could potentially create a situation of information asymmetry. 1
The existence of vulture funds indicates there might be opportunities to earn good
returns on distressed or defaulted assets.
Both the liquidity factor and the asymmetric information after a default event
can bias the estimate of the recovery rate downwards. In general non-defaulted
bonds have high probabilities of debt service and thus fairly small variations in
1 Financial organizations that specialize in distressed securities, such as near default or
defaulted bonds or shares, are commonly referred to as vulture funds.
2their expected pay-o® space. The holders of defaulted corporate bonds have to ¯nd
some means of knowing what their bonds are worth. A natural choice is to look at
what has been recovered in earlier defaults, making the historic recovery rates the
norm also for future recovery rates. The cross-sectional studies of recovery rates
started with Altman & Kishore (1996). Recovery rates are now studied by the
rating agencies as a matter of routine (cf. Moody's (2007)). Altman & Kishore
(1996) shows that industry and the seniority of a bond matters for the recovery
rate in the cross-section. They cannot show that investment grade status, size
of issue, or longevity before default has any impact on the recovery rate. The
frequent studies of the cross-section can be self ful¯lling, but should not in°uence
a possible bias. That is, any pre-existing bias can be strengthened by the success
of the cross-sectional studies since it is the only information available on recovery
rates.
There are three common ways of de¯ning the recovery rate of defaulted bonds in
the literature:
² recovery of the face value of the bond,
² recovery of market value preceding the default, or
² an equivalent, but default-free, bond.
These three methods are all based on an instant change into a safe asset. If there
are unlimited trading opportunities the three methods are equivalent. If it is not
possible to immediately realize the bond, then the variation in the recovery rate
of the bond is important for the economic value of a defaulted bond. The recovery
rate of face value is the market price one month after default of the bond divided
by the face value, and the recovery rate of market value is the market price one
month after default of the bond divided by the market price one month before the
default.
There are two issues that can generate bias in the recovery rate; post default risk
and information asymmetry between investors. Altman & Pompeii (2003) show
that the market value divided by the face value of defaulted bonds varies from
0.15 to 0.74 and di®ers from year to year. The bonds in their sample are the
defaulted bonds that are included in the Altman-NYU Salomon Center Defaulted
Bond Index. Corporate bonds typically do not have a well functioning secondary
markets, so it is plausible that variation in recovery rates can have an impact on
bond prices.
There are a few possible ways to ¯gure out if there is a systematic bias in the
cross-sectional default rates:
3² the repayments from defaulted bonds could be summed and discounted for a net
present value,
² the returns from vulture funds could be tested for excess returns, or
² the return on bonds of defaulted ¯rms could be tested for excess returns.
The repayments from defaulted ¯rms are di±cult to study since the data are
typically not public and it often takes a long time until the default is resolved
and/or bankruptcy is ¯nalized. The main problem with studying vulture funds is
that there is a collection of assets in the funds at any time. Some of these assets
might be recently defaulted bonds, but there can be many other assets as well. The
vulture fund managers may add value to the defaulted securities after default and
such a study can be biased to increase the value of the assets at default. I study the
return on bonds of companies that have defaulted on their securities for a limited
number of months after default. There are two reasons for studying a short time
period after default. First, it takes time to do value enhancing restructurings, and
second, it is possible that the recovery rate is depressed by a larger than usual
supply just after default.
The underlying claim that is tested in this study is straight forward;
Claim 1 The market price of a recently defaulted bond is biased
Multiple regression analysis is used to test the claim that the one month recov-
ery rate estimation is biased. I calculate the cross-sectional recovery rate (as can
be compared to for instance Moody's (2007)), and introduce time-series tests on
defaulted corporate bond returns. The risk factors used to explain the excess re-
turns do not in fact explain the returns. This implies that there is mispricing for
defaulted bond returns. Neither the common liquidity nor the Fama & French
(1992) share factors have any strong bearing on the excess return after default.
The estimated recovery rates ares four percent too low on average to make the
excess return go away during 2001-2006.
In the next section, the model for bond values are described. In section 3 the
tests and calculations that deviate from standard asset pricing tests are presented.
The summary statistics of the sample and how the sample selection was done
is described in section 4. The results are presented and discussed in section 5.
Concluding remarks are presented in section 6.
42 Model for corporate bond value
The purpose of this section is 1) to explain how the default value of the bond
relates to the before default value and 2) to describe how the bond recovery value
can be compared over periods after default. The value of the bond (V ) at time t
is equal to the discounted present value of the expected value of the bond value at
date t + 1.
Vt = e
¡rtE [Vt+1 + Ct+1] (1)
For simplicity assume that the coupon is zero here (Ct+1 = 0). De¯ning the default
probability between t and t + 1 as ¼t;t+1 and assume it is exogenous. De¯ne the
value of the bond at time t+1 as V d
t+1 for the default state and V s
t+1 in the survival
state. The value of the default state is the recovery value. The survival value of
the bond is ultimately the promised payment. The states of default or survival are

















The default probability of a safe bond is by de¯nition ¼t;T = 0 and the safe bond
value at maturity (T) is thus equal to its face value VT = 1. The payment in
default is the object of interest, so de¯ne the payment in default function as ± :
ft+1 ! V d
t+1. The set of factors ft+1 contain all information necessary to determine
the payment in default (V d
t+1). ± can be seen as the time-varying exchange rate
between the promised payment and the payment at default, so ± (ft+1) · V s
t+1.
Assuming a constant probability of default (¼) gives the valuation formula at time
t before default ¿ (t < ¿):
Vt =¼e








and after default t > ¿:
Vt =e
¡rtE [±(ft+1)] (4)
Assume that creditors take over when a company defaults on its debt payments.
This implies that the company is then free of all debt and there cannot be any
additional defaults. Since I study only a short time after default, this should not
in°uence the results.
There are three standard ways to de¯ne the default payment function; recovery of
5face value of the bond ±(ft+1) = k1, recovery of market value ±(ft+1) = k2Vt, and
recovery in a safe bond ±(ft+1) = k3V s
t+1, where k1, k2 and k3 are constants. In
the recovery of a safe bond an investor receives a fraction (k3) of a safe bond that
otherwise has the same characteristics as the defaulted bond. All three methods
are point estimates. If there are risk adjusted excess returns after default it is not
possible to trade the defaulted bond and get an economic value that corresponds
to any of the the three methods. This transaction problem can make empirical
estimates for default payments using the three methods invalid.
If liquidity is poor after default, a bond owner is exposed to the variability of the
asset price and an unknown holding period. This can result in changing values of






where q is the number of time periods after default, and ½i the discount rate. I use
the risk adjusted discount rate in a Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) setting,
as can bee seen in equation (8). The value of the bond at default depends on the
return on the asset ±(ft+1) function and the holding period q.
3 Test method
First the recovery rates are calculated for each year for seniority and industry
groups. The default time is not de¯ned as when the bond issuer formally defaulted
on the obligation, but the time when the market adapted the bond price to include
the certain future default of the ¯rm on the interest or principal. 2 In practice this
means that the largest negative price adjustment for each time series is de¯ned as
the default period. After default equity factors can be expected to play a larger role
in explaining the expected returns and therefore market, liquidity, Small-Minus-
Big (SMB) and High-Minus-Low (HML) are tested.
All returns are measured excluding the accrued interest. 3 Only in cases where the
2 The price adjustment occurs when investors realize that the company will not be able
to service the debt. The actual default date is the date the service is due.
3 Even if investors' claims on principal or interest are equivalent from an economic
perspective, they might be treated di®erently in the prescription clauses of the bonds.
There are instances of di®erent prescription times for principal and interest. In addition
to smaller di®erences in contractual treatment, Asquith et al. (1994) ¯nd that banks
6bond is repaid in full does this exclusion matter. This is not common for defaulted
bonds, so the impact on my results should be minimal. All tests have also been
done also with returns including the accrued interest. The di®erence in results are
minimal and if anything the inclusion of the accrued interest increases the excess
return and risk adjusted discounted recovery rate.
3.1 Cross-section
The cross-sectional recovery rates are presented as averages, but calculated using
OLS, since this facilitates calculating measures on variability such as the explained
variation (R2).
3.2 Time-series
To test if the market price of a defaulted bond is biased, the returns are tested
for excess returns. The idea is to ¯nd out if the defaulted bonds have returns that
exceed their risk compensation. A defaulted bond can be seen as something that
is between debt or equity, since the true status typically is unknown at the time of
default. This unknown status implies that either factors important for corporate
bond pricing or equity pricing might be useful in risk adjusting the defaulted bond
returns.
Factors that have been found to in°uence corporate bond pricing in earlier studies
are tested for my sample of defaulted bonds. This means for the defaulted bonds
that I test for a CAPM market risk factor and liquidity risk factors. The mar-
ket risk factor can be expected to increase in signi¯cance after the default simply
from the bond taking on a more equity like pay-o® pro¯le. The earlier tests are
complemented with testing for liquidity risk in defaulted bonds, and construct
bond liquidity factor series in Section 4.1. In addition to the test of bond factors
I test factors from Fama & French (1992) which have been successful in explain-
ing equity returns. Aside from the market factor, Fama and French calculates the
Small-Minus-Big (SMB) and High-Minus-Low (HML) factors from a set of port-
folios.
The statistical models used to test for signi¯cance of factors are standard portfolio
almost never forgive principal as part of any comprehensive debt restructuring that
include subordinated public creditors.
7tests, with portfolio formation dependent on industry and seniority. The estimation
equation can be seen in equation (6),
Rt ¡ R
f
t = ® + ¯Ft + ²t; (6)
here Rt is the simple return on a bond at time t, Rf is the risk free return, Ft is
a vector of factors, and ²t is the error term. All tested factors are not zero cost
portfolios. This implies that for the non zero cost portfolios the average value of
the factors can in°uence the estimated intercept, and hence the estimated excess
return. As it turns out, this is not a problem.
The portfolios are equally weighted, since the market capitalization cannot be
determined from my data set. Studies on equity portfolios use typically use value-
weighted portfolios. The choice of equally weighted portfolios can give smaller issue
bonds a relative large impact on the results.
3.3 Present value of recovery rates
To estimate the economic signi¯cance of the post default variations in the recovery
rate, the present value of the recovery rate of face value (market price of the bonds
divided by their face value) after default is calculated. The interest rate for market
risk is adjusted to see if the estimate for ±¿+n over time di®ers from the \at default"
recovery rates for both book and market values. The discounting is presented below
in equation (8).
Defaulted bonds are assets which need to generate risk adjusted returns for in-
vestors to hold them. There should be an insigni¯cant excess return (alpha) and
insigni¯cant betas if the use of a risk free asset as a proxy for the recovery value is
a good assessment. The variability in price of the safe asset is by nature small, and
the default probability is also small (empirically fractions of percent per month).
If the value in default is too depressed, then there should be excess returns in
the months following the default. These excess returns are the ¯ngerprints of the
too low recovery rate. The sample is randomly divided into two groups to avoid






t = ®j + ¯jFt + ²t; (7)
where R
j
t is the return on bond j at time t, R
f
t is the risk free return, Ft is a vector
of factors, and ²t is the error term. Time (t) runs from the time of default (¿) for
k periods. The coe±cient estimates are used for calculating the discount rate in
8the next equation.
The second group is used to calculate the out-of-sample present value of the equiv-
alent recovery rate of face value (RR = CleanPrice
FaceV alue ). This operation is done to make
the recovery rates comparable over time. Note that the excess return test is suf-
¯cient to answer the question of bias in the recovery rate at default. The present




i=¿ (1 + R
f
i + ^ ¯Fi)
; (8)
where alpha is assumed to be zero and beta (^ ¯) is the mean estimated parameter
from the ¯rst group 4 estimated in accordance with equation (7). Equation (8) is
used to calculate the present value up to nine months after default (n). The reason
for this relatively short period is that the tests are if the recovery rate might be
depressed at the time of default, not if there is a drift in the asset value.
4 Data
The sample consists of 134 companies with 279 defaulted bond price series. No
company has issued more than 4 percent of the bonds in the sample. The sample
is collected from the Thomson/Datastream database. All bonds in the sample have
¯xed coupons. The sample period covers six years from 2001 to the end of 2006.
A problem with corporate bond data is typically thin trading. For the average
bond in the Datastream sample, trade volume is registered in the ISMA TRAX
system 5 in 14 percent of all months. The average traded volume (nominal) for a
traded bond is 7.8 MUSD per month. The traded volume is on average about 264
MSUD per month in the sample. The median bond issue has an amount issued of
200 MUSD.
Datastream does not only rely on the TRAX system for price information, but
mainly source their corporate bond data from FT Interactive Data (FTID). FTID
4 Each bond is assigned a post-default beta in accordance with what grouping it belongs
to.
5 ISMA (the International Securities Market Association) is the self-regulatory organi-
zation and trade association for the international securities market (including the Eu-
robond market). ISMA TRAX is the ISMA trade matching and regulatory reporting
system for the OTC markets.
9uses market transactions and calculates prices using, amongst other things, bid
information from their fund clients. According to FTID; prices are calculated to
re°ect veri¯able information to the extent that it is formative for the good faith
opinion of FTID as to what a buyer would pay for the bond in a current sale.
The price information has a tendency to go stale after the default, i.e. the same
price is repeated during several time periods in the data set. If there is a problem
with stale prices, the intercepts in the CAPM tests are negative since there is
a ¯nancing cost (Rf), but no income from the bond. The default event seems to
create volume. The average turn-over ¯ve months after default is 24 percent higher
than the average turnover ¯ve months before default, measured in terms of face
value. Using the, potentially, stale clean prices favors ¯nding no positive excess
return, or lower discounted recovery rates since coupons are excluded.
Summary statistics for the sample of defaulted bond are presented in Table 1.
Table 1. Monthly sample returns during ten month before default and
ten months after default.
Asset Observations Mean Std dev Skewness Kurtosis Min Max
Entire sample 279 -0.00 0.34 39.86 2316.62 -1.00 24.00
Senior Secured 29 -0.00 0.11 -0.46 36.79 -1.00 0.95
Senior Unsecured 113 -0.00 0.41 43.52 2380.52 -1.00 24.00
Senior Subordinated 52 -0.00 0.41 23.99 752.48 -0.99 14.00
Subordinated 21 0.01 0.33 14.73 296.49 -0.99 7.00
Junior Subordinated 41 0.00 0.22 19.76 597.50 -0.99 7.00
Unknown 23 -0.00 0.11 -0.51 37.28 -0.83 1.00
Oil&Gas 4 -0.01 0.09 -1.55 16.88 -0.55 0.39
Basic Material 23 -0.00 0.22 9.35 208.71 -1.00 5.00
Industrials 30 -0.00 0.18 2.36 45.37 -0.98 2.33
Consumer Goods 35 -0.01 0.32 26.11 937.63 -0.98 11.50
Health Care 16 0.04 0.85 26.89 761.58 -1.00 24.00
Consumer Services 65 -0.00 0.12 0.44 18.25 -0.85 1.00
Telecommunications 42 -0.02 0.20 1.62 39.79 -1.00 3.00
Utilities 46 0.00 0.23 23.76 735.99 -0.99 7.00
Financial 4 0.05 1.06 11.64 147.34 -0.96 14.00
Technology 14 0.01 0.63 20.04 467.84 -0.94 15.00
This table presents returns from a sample of 279 defaulted corporate bonds. The
bonds are collected from Thomson/Datastream. The return for each bond-month is
the clean price return (
Pt¡Pt¡1
Pt¡1 ). The seniority of the bonds have been identi¯ed
from the EDGAR database. Bonds where the seniority has been unclear are classi¯ed
as Unknown. The classi¯cation into industries follow the ICB standard.
10There is a large negative return in each bond return series (the default) and this
in°uences all moments of the return series. The mean return for the entire sample
is negative, but some groups have positive mean returns. The standard deviations
are high compared to the mean returns, the skewness is positive and the kurtosis
is high.
The sample characteristics for the defaulted bonds can be expected to be di®erent
from a random sample of corporate bonds. The reason is that a random sample
contains few defaults compared to this sample. Nine months after default six per-
cent of the defaulted bonds have a clean price higher than their face value. Sixteen
percent have a clean price lower than two percent of their face value.
Table 2. Bounce back and drop dead bonds after default.
Category/Month 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Active bonds 279 279 279 278 277 274 274 274 274
Value > face value 14 15 14 16 16 14 16 17 17
Value < 2 percent face value 47 40 43 41 41 40 43 44 43
This table presents the number of bonds that recover after default
and the number of bonds that are valued at less than 2 percent of
face value up to nine months after the default event.
4.1 Liquidity measures
The liquidity risk has been shown to be important for the pricing of corporate
bonds. There are many ways to operationalize the liquidity measure; three ways
are measures of traded volume, market impact of a large transaction, and the size
of the di®erence between the bid and ask spreads. The available data has low
frequency (monthly) and contains only prices and traded volumes, so the return
and volume based liquidity measures are used. Two share price based factors are
tested. The idea with the share price based factors is that they capture general
sensitivity of asset prices against systematic liquidity risk. Finally two measures
are calculated from a sample of 3,774 U.S. corporate bond price series.
The two share based series are calculated according to Sadka (2006) and P¶ astor &
Stambaugh (2003). Both these series are available from 2001 through 2005. The
P¶ astor and Stambaugh series are based on a volume reversal coe±cient. They ¯nd
that their market wide liquidity factor is priced. To complement the share price
based liquidity measures, measures for liquidity risk are calculated from the sample
of corporate bond returns.
11From the sample of corporate bond price series innovations are calculated in line
with what P¶ astor & Stambaugh (2003) does for the stock market. Monthly data
give a limited number of data points. The idea is to calculate the return response










¢ vi;t + ²i;t; (9)
where sign(¢) is a function that takes on -1 or 1 depending on the sign of the input,
and the variables are de¯ned as in P¶ astor & Stambaugh (2003):
ri;t: the clean price return on bond i in month t
re
i;t: ri;t ¡ rm;t, where rm;t is the average clean price return on all the
bonds in the sample during month t,
vi;t: the nominal traded volume reported in the TRAX system for bond
i in month t, and
²i;t: the residual
The gamma (°) coe±cient is the excess return response to trading volume. The
sign(¢) function eliminates the di®erence between positive and negative excess re-
turns, making the coe±cient linear in absolute volume. The underlying economic
idea is that an increase in trading volume in°ates the return in the ¯rst time pe-
riod and when the trading volume decreases in the next time period the returns
decrease, i.e. a return reversal. If this idea is correct the gamma can be expected to
be negative on average. High trading volumes should be associated with negative
excess returns in the next time period. 6 Only bond month observations where
there is trade volume reported in TRAX are included in the regression. Monthly
return observations with abnormally high (+10%) and low (-10%) returns are ex-
cluded. This gives 1,745 coe±cient estimates for the entire period. For each time







The average return response coe±cient is a measure of how large the average return
6 This is true, the mean ° for all bonds in the sample is negative -2.0e-009 with a
standard deviation of 1.3e-007.
12reversal is in the next time period. P¶ astor & Stambaugh (2003) have a problem
with an upwards trend in their sample of NYSE and AMEX bonds. My shorter
sample period does not exhibit this problem, and it does not have signi¯cant serial
correlation 7 , so the innovation is calculated in a similar manner, but exclude the
dollar value scaling quota,
¢^ °t = a + b¢^ °t¡1 + c^ °t¡1 + ut (11)
The regression in equation (11) produces serially uncorrelated residuals. The resid-
uals are the part of the changes in return response coe±cients that does not depend
on earlier changes or levels of return response coe±cients. The idea is to clean the
return response innovations from time series dependencies.





The re-scaling by 100 is done to follow P¶ astor & Stambaugh (2003), but is not
necessary for the bond series, since the traded volumes typically are large in com-
parison to the returns. The e®ect of not re-scaling means that the factor values
are very small and that there will be some very large liquidity beta estimates.
In addition to the share based series and the above bond liquidity measure, a second
bond liquidity measure, AILLIQ, is calculated in line with Amihud (2002). 8 More







where Nj is the number of bond observations in month t, rk;t is the clean price net
return for bond k during period t, and vk;y is the reported daily average nominal
volume in the TRAX system. AILLIQt is thus the average quota between absolute
7 The ¯rst order serial correlation is 0.20, slightly below P¶ astor and Stambaugh's 0.22,
but not signi¯cant.
8 Both bond series are calculated from February 2001 through 2006. Amihud sums
over days when there has been trading, while here only the months when the TRAX
system has reported trading volume is used in the cross-sectional calculations. Amihud
calculates the absolute mean average daily return and here the absolute monthly return
is calculated from clean prices, ignoring the possible e®ect of the accrued coupon.
13clean price return and reported transaction volume. In the ¯rst month included
(February 2001) there are 72 quotes. This is the smallest number of quotes in the
sample and the maximum is 1,011.
The measures for liquidity risk are all based on changes in return in relation to
trading volumes. The pair wise correlation between the series is calculated, to see
if there are similarities between the di®erent liquidity series.
Table 3. Pairwise correlation between liquidity measures.






PS Level -0.03 0.05 -0.04
(0.80) (0.70) (0.74)
PS Innov -0.03 -0.05 -0.06 0.75
(0.81) (0.70) (0.64) (0.00)
Sadka TF -0.13 -0.11 -0.04 -0.02 -0.15
(0.34) (0.40) (0.79) (0.90) (0.24)
Sadka PV -0.13 -0.27 -0.09 0.04 0.09 0.25
(0.32) (0.04) (0.52) (0.78) (0.49) (0.05)
This table presents the pairwise correlations between the di®erent measures of liquidity. The
measures are the AILLIQ measure, as calculated in equation (13), the ^ °t, as calculated in
equation (10). The Lt is the innovations in liquidity in the bond market, as calculated in
equation (12). The two PS series (Level and Innov) are the level and innovations for the stock
market in accordance with P¶ astor & Stambaugh (2003). The two Sadka series are ¯xed (TF)
and variable (PV) price e®ects, calculated according to Sadka (2006). In parenthesis below each
pairwise correlation is the signi¯cance level.
The bond based series (AILLIQ, ^ °t, and Lt) have insigni¯cant and mostly negative
correlations with the share based series. Only a few of the correlations are signi¯-
cantly di®erent from zero. The liquidity series seems to measure di®erent aspects
of liquidity since they are di®erent from each other. The implication is that all
liquidity measures needs to be used in the later tests.
4.2 Institutional setting
A company can enter into default in several ways:
14² the company fails to pay interest on the due date,
² the company fail to pay the principal on the due date,
² the company breaches any other covenants or warranties connected to the secu-
rities and the failure continues, or
² the company declares itself in bankruptcy, insolvency or reorganization.
Investors can purchase corporate bonds at issue or in the secondary market. On the
secondary market corporate bonds are either traded over-the-counter or through an
exchange. Only some of the corporate bonds that are traded through an exchange
are formally listed. More than 60 percent of the bonds in the sample are quoted and
traded at the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). Most of the bonds in the sample
(at least 233 out of 279) have equities listed on one of the U.S. exchanges. The
companies that have listed equity are required to follow standard disclosure and
reporting regulations. There is no listing agreement for a debt issuer on NYSE, but
the regulations for listed companies state that the issuer must release all relevant
information immediately upon determining that the interest or principal will not
be paid in full.
Firms in ¯nancial distress have a number of options for how to avoid bankruptcy.
The two main options are to do an informal restructuring with the creditors or
to ¯le for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11 of the U.S. bankruptcy code.
Asquith et al. (1994) ¯nds that only 42 of their 102 ¯nancially distressed ¯rms ¯le
for bankruptcy. The ¯rms try to avoid going into Chapter 11 since the process is




The cross-sectional recovery rates are in line with the data of other studies, for
instance by Altman & Kishore (1996) or the yearly Moody's report. Moody's has
a larger sample since they include bonds from several countries. The ¯gures here
include only US corporate bonds, so the parameters di®er somewhat from Moody's.
In Table 4 through 6 the recovery rate based on market value grouped by seniority
and industry is calculated.
15Table 4. Average market value recovery rate on defaulted corporate bonds per year by seniority.
Senior Sec. Senior Unsec. Senior Subo. Subordinated Junior Sub. Unknown
Year Rate Number Rate Number Rate Number Rate Number Rate Number Rate Number
2001 0.80 5 0.51 10 0.48 3 0.34 2 0.21 10 0.81 8
2002 0.85 9 0.49 68 0.41 21 0.43 9 0.58 10 0.59 8
2003 0.43 10 0.35 8 0.28 10 0.56 4 0.84 5 0.77 4
2004 0.98 1 0.55 5 0.52 9 - 0 - 0 - 0
2005 0.83 2 0.61 18 0.56 6 0.68 5 0.73 13 0.69 3
2006 0.94 2 0.71 4 0.46 3 0.75 1 0.79 3 - 0
Average 0.71 29 0.51 113 0.43 52 0.52 21 0.59 41 0.71 23
Book rate 0.62 29 0.31 113 0.27 52 0.25 21 0.46 41 0.64 23
Median 0.89 0.53 0.42 0.53 0.66 0.87
Std Dev 0.33 0.27 0.30 0.20 0.29 0.27
This table presents the average recovery rate for defaulted bonds. The recovery rate is cal-
culated from clean prices as 1 +
Pt¡Pt¡1
Pt¡1 . The R2 and ¹ R2 for the entire sample are 9.7 and
8.1 per cent respectively. The book rate is the average clean price on the month after default
divided by the par value. Each estimate is followed by the number of observations used to
calculate it.
The seniority of a corporate bond is an indicator for the level of the recovery rate.
There is a pattern where both the average market and the book recovery rate are
higher for the senior bonds and the junior subordinated bonds. There is a smile
pattern in the average recovery rate. The explained variation (R2) is 9.7 percent
for the entire sample, indicating a considerable variation around the means. If
regressions are run for each individual year, the R2 is about 80-90 percent. This
di®erence in explained variation indicates that the time variation in recovery rates
is high.
The recovery rates of face value are lower than the recovery rates of market value.
There are two reasons for this. First, the recovery rate of face value incorporates
all price adjustments before the default and the recovery rate of market value only
what is lost during the month of default. Second, the recovery rate of market value
is calculated with a smaller denominator, due to the partial adjustment in price.
The lower recovery rate of face value indicates that the market has anticipated the
defaults to some extent.
I divide the sample into the ten ICB sector code industries and present the average
recovery rate of market value in Table 5.
16Table 5. Average market value recovery rate on defaulted corporate bonds per year by industry.
Oil&GasBasic Indust. ConsumerHealth ConsumerTelecomUtilitiesFinancialTech.
Material Goods care services
Year RateNr RateNr RateNr RateNr RateNr RateNr RateNr RateNr RateNr RateNr
2001 -0 0.41 4 0.65 3 0.20 2 - 0 0.78 8 0.37 4 0.4815 0.781 0.17 1
2002 -0 0.51 4 0.5016 0.63 6 0.55 9 0.6024 0.3836 0.6420 0.193 0.48 7
2003 0.682 0.4812 0.24 5 0.41 4 0.29 3 0.6912 0.05 2 - 0 -0 0.20 1
2004 0.872 0.28 2 0.47 2 0.45 5 0.04 1 0.98 2 - 0 0.98 1 -0 - 0
2005 -0 0.80 1 0.82 2 0.5810 0.88 3 0.6818 - 0 0.72 9 -0 0.34 4
2006 -0 - 0 0.61 2 0.64 8 - 0 0.93 1 - 0 0.95 1 -0 0.95 1
Average 0.774 0.4723 0.5030 0.5435 0.5316 0.6865 0.3642 0.6246 0.344 0.4314
Median 0.83 0.55 0.59 0.62 0.56 0.66 0.28 0.74 0.27 0.39
Std Dev 0.23 0.28 0.32 0.32 0.29 0.21 0.24 0.31 0.32 0.30
This table presents the average recovery rate for defaulted corporate bonds. The recovery rate
is calculated from clean prices as 1 +
Pt¡Pt¡1
Pt¡1 . The R2 and ¹ R2 for the entire sample are 14.6
and 11.7 per cent respectively. Each estimate is followed by the number of observations used to
calculate it.
The results from the industry based sample are similar to the results from the
seniority sample, with low panel R2 and high yearly R2. Each year in general
has only a few data points, so it is not possible to draw any conclusions on the
distribution or time variation from this grouping.
Firms in di®erent industries typically have di®erent compositions of assets. The
recovery rates grouped by seniority and industry are presented in Table 6.
Table 6. Average market recovery rate on defaulted corporate bonds by seniority and industry.
Senior Sec. Senior Unsec. Senior Subo. Subordinated Junior Sub. Unknown
Industry Rate Nr Rate Nr Rate Nr Rate Nr Rate Nr Rate Nr
Oil&Gas 0.90 1 0.73 3 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0
Basic Material 0.41 7 0.60 3 0.46 7 0.59 2 0.48 2 0.39 2
Industrials 0.63 3 0.64 11 0.37 15 - 0 - 0 0.62 1
Consumer Goods 0.49 1 0.51 11 0.37 13 0.75 1 0.79 8 0.98 1
Health care - 0 0.51 11 0.58 4 0.65 1 - 0 - 0
Consumer services 0.69 6 0.58 17 0.61 6 0.61 10 0.75 13 0.81 13
Telecomm. 0.91 1 0.34 28 0.81 1 0.42 5 0.30 6 0.27 1
Utilities 0.92 9 0.61 19 0.29 1 0.01 1 0.43 12 0.74 4
Financial - 0 0.58 2 0.04 1 0.17 1 - 0 - 0
Technology 0.95 1 0.42 8 0.38 4 - 0 - 0 0.17 1
This table presents the average recovery rate for defaulted bonds. The recovery rate is calculated
from clean prices as 1 +
Pt¡Pt¡1
Pt¡1 . The R2 and ¹ R2 are 82 and 23 per cent respectively.
17The R2 is naturally high since there are many explanatory variables to data points.
When this is adjusted for in the ¹ R2 the explanatory value drop considerably. There
are even fewer data points per grouping.
The cross-sectional recovery rates are in line with earlier results. There is some
time variation, as can be seen in Table 4. A di®erent type of time variation is the
theme of the next section, the after default time variation.
5.2 Time-series
Time-series of defaulted bond returns are problematic, since they contain both
stale prices and 'dead cat bounces'. 9 Stale prices will in this setup give zero re-
turns on the bond and make it harder to ¯nd excess returns. In later periods when
the potentially stale price adjusts, it is easier to ¯nd excess returns. Cross-sectional
smoothing should alleviate this problem. For a schematic overview of what hap-
pened to the mean returns of defaulted corporate bonds I include Figure 1. The





N is the number of bonds, ¿ is the time period, R¿;i return on bond i, and Rf
¿
the risk free rate. The cumulative mean excess return is the cumulative sum of the
presented mean excess returns.











































































Fig. 1. Mean excess return on defaulted corporate bonds 2001-2006.
The mean excess return from corporate bonds is negative before the default occurs,
implying that investors adjust their pricing before the default. This adjustment can
9 A dead cat bounce is when a moderate rise in the price of a stock follows a spectacular
fall, with the connotation that the rise does not indicate improving circumstances.
18also have happened for many bonds not entering into the default state, so it does
not necessarily carry any information. More interesting is that, as can be seen in
Figure 1, the mean excess return is consistently positive after the default. The
fairly sharp rise in returns in the months after the default implies that there might
be an overshooting e®ect, at least for the mean excess return.
The positive mean excess return after default raises the question of what bonds
perform well after the default. Is it the same bonds that consistently do well in
a turnaround situation? To answer this question I rank the sample into deciles
depending on their return one month after the default.
Table 7. Average excess return in decile portfolios after default.
Portfolio/Month 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Mean ½
Portfolio 1 -0.38 0.94 0.07 -0.24 0.11 -0.14 0.16 -0.01 0.05 0.16 0.07 -0.39
Portfolio 2 -0.15 0.02 0.06 0.18 0.09 -0.02 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.09 0.04 0.20
Portfolio 3 -0.07 -0.04 0.01 0.10 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.09 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.28
Portfolio 4 -0.02 0.01 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.04 -0.01 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.33
Portfolio 5 -0.00 0.03 0.52 0.06 0.06 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.57 0.03 0.13 -0.27
Portfolio 6 -0.00 -0.05 -0.02 -0.05 0.00 0.00 0.42 0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.03 -0.03
Portfolio 7 0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.00 -0.02 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.15
Portfolio 8 0.06 -0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.00 0.04 0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.04 0.02 -0.36
Portfolio 9 0.18 -0.04 0.04 0.02 -0.01 0.10 0.02 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.05 -0.43
Portfolio 10 1.15 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.07 0.01 0.02 0.13 -0.02
Mean 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.08 0.02 0.08 0.04 0.05 -0.04
This table presents the average clean price excess return for decile portfolios ranked
on log excess return the month after default. The average log excess return for each
decile portfolio is presented for ten months following the default. ½ is the ¯rst order
autocorrelation coe±cient for the mean excess returns in each portfolio.
From the mean excess returns per portfolio in Table 7 it is not evident that some
bonds will recover more than others, or that there is any pattern from the return
ranking. Longer ranking periods have been tested, but the results are similar with
no clear pattern in the cross section. The median variability for the portfolio returns
is 0.04, with three outliers (Portfolios 1, 5, and 6). The potential turn around in
excess returns after default is present in all ten portfolios. The strong excess return
could be explained by risk. The correlations are fairly large, but not signi¯cant.
5.2.1 Risk explanations
Two risks for corporate bonds can be expected to survive a default; the market
and the liquidity risks. The market risk could even be expected to increase since
19the bond after default has a pay-o® pro¯le more resembling a share. Predicting
how the liquidity risk should change is not as clear cut. The increase in volume
after default decreases the risk associated with selling the bonds, but trading on
asymmetric information could increase the risk.
The initial test on the entire sample of defaulted corporate bonds is presented
in Table 8 below. I test for excess returns before and after the default event. All
the liquidity factors calculated in section 4.1 are used, but only four of them are
presented in Table 8. The excluded ones are not signi¯cant and the intercept and
market beta are no di®erent than the ones presented in Table 8. The risk factors
of Fama & French (1992) are also used as additional controls, and reported in
Table A.1 in Appendix A. The results are similar to the ones in Table 8, where
the SMB and HML coe±cients are signi¯cant before default but only HML after.
The intercept and market beta are only marginally di®erent when the SMB and
HML factors are included.
20Table 8. Return beta representation for the one-factor model and the liquidity factor.
Panel A. Bond betas before default.
Intercept -0.02 -8.13 *** -0.03 -6.21 *** -0.03 -8.31 *** -0.02 -8.00 *** -0.03 -7.83 ***
¯Market 0.29 4.36 *** 0.28 4.22 *** 0.26 3.79 *** 0.25 3.78 *** 0.30 4.56 ***
¯AILLIQ 2133.11 0.68
¯P&SBond -894640.18 -1.54
¯P&SStock 0.18 2.51 **
¯Sadka 1.78 2.13 *
Obs. 2387 2387 2349 2330 2330
R2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
¹ R2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Panel B. Bond betas after default.
Intercept 0.05 4.08 *** 0.06 4.03 *** 0.05 4.05 *** 0.05 3.98 *** 0.05 3.64 ***





Obs. 2707 2707 2707 2395 2395
R2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
¹ R2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Re = ® + ¯F + "
In this table the one-factor model, and two-factor liquidity models, are tested on a sample of defaulted
bonds, measured in default time. Panel A consists of the estimated coe±cients before the default event
and Panel B consists of the estimated coe±cients after the default. The data is pooled for ten months
before default (Panel A) and ten months after default (Panel B). The market beta (¯Market) uses the
market factor of Fama & French (1992). The liquidity measures are based on Amihud (2002), P¶ astor
& Stambaugh (2003) and Sadka (2006). The speci¯cations of the liquidity measures are described in
Section 2.4.1, equations (12) and (13). The t-statistics are calculated using robust standard errors.
***, **, and * denotes signi¯cance on the 1, 2.5, and 5 percent level.
Two of the liquidity risk factors are signi¯cant before the default event. None of
the liquidity factors are signi¯cant after default. Either the measures of liquidity
risk do not in°uence pricing for bond in default, or the measures are inadequate
for capturing the liquidity risk. The AILLIQ and P&S Bond betas are very large,
as anticipated. 10 However, they do not seem to in°uence the size of the intercept
much and are insigni¯cant, so the potential problem with bias in the intercept is
most likely minor.
The intercept in Panel A is negative, indicating that bonds have poor returns before
10 This is a result from the choice not to re-scale the liquidity measures.
21a possible default. The estimated betas are high for corporate bonds (0.25-0.30)
compared to betas for going concerns estimated by Weinstein (1981) (mean betas
against stock market 0.03-0.21 during 1964-1972) or Thorsell (2008) (0.06 during
2001-2005). Now, these bonds are part of a choice based sample, and do default
but this pattern could be present in other bonds as well, so it is not a certain
indicator of imminent default. The risk measures in the test do not do a good job
at capturing the variability, as measured by the R2 (1 percent). The intercepts
and the market betas are all signi¯cantly di®erent from zero, but the liquidity
coe±cients are not. The low signi¯cance of the liquidity coe±cients is puzzling,
considering that trading volumes tends to increase both before and after default,
and that liquidity risk is a common explanation for corporate bond returns. The
liquidity factors have only slightly higher signi¯cance if the market beta is left out
of the regressions. Hence it is not the market beta that crowds out the liquidity
factors.
After the default event, in Panel B, the sample can be considered to be a ran-
dom selection of defaulted bonds. The intercepts turn positive (0.05-0.06) and are
signi¯cant. Considering that the intercepts are the average monthly unexplained
excess return, they are very high. The median unexplained excess return is about
1.6 percent per month. This di®erence between mean and median indicates that
the distribution is non-normal. The robust standard errors of White (1980) are
used to decrease the problem of non-normality. The market beta increases to 0.46-
0.53, as could be expected from the bond becoming more equity-like. The variance
in the clean price returns increases from a mean of 0.03 before default to a mean
of 0.43 after default, more than ten fold. As could be expected from the signi¯cant
intercept and insigni¯cant parameter estimates the R2 is zero.
The weak performance of the tested risk factors and the large positive intercept
from Table 8 indicates that a portfolio of defaulted bonds acquired at default
generates excess returns. The spread of returns in Table 7 is fairly even, and it
looks like most defaulted bonds have an expected positive return. The tentative
conclusion is that the average bond is underpriced in the default month, and that
at least the risks I have tested are not the reason for this under pricing.
Market risk, but not liquidity risk, seems to be important for the pricing of de-
faulted bonds. The large variation in post default returns and earlier cross-sectional
results on industries and seniority give cause to investigate if the risk pro¯le di®ers
in these dimensions.
225.2.2 Seniority
The priority in bankruptcy determines how much of a bonds value is recovered in
bankruptcy. The di®erent priority bonds typically get paid in di®erent fractions, see
Table 4. The standard deviation also di®ers between the di®erent priorities. It could
thus be expected that both the intercept and the market beta varies depending on
priority ranking. The data on the priority ranked portfolios is presented below in
Table 9.
Table 9. Return beta representation for seniority ranked portfolios.
Panel A. Bond betas before default.
Priority Intercept ¯Market Obs. R2 ¹ R2
Senior Secured -0.01 -0.73 0.10 0.63 249 0.00 0.00
Senior Unsecured -0.03 -6.07 *** 0.38 3.93 *** 1019 0.01 0.01
Senior Subordinated -0.03 -3.71 *** 0.33 2.14 ** 469 0.01 0.01
Subordinated -0.04 -2.60 *** 0.19 0.65 163 0.00 0.00
Junior Subordinated -0.03 -5.36 *** 0.28 2.18 ** 322 0.01 0.01
Unknown 0.00 0.09 0.21 1.02 165 0.01 0.00
Panel B. Bond betas after default.
Senior Secured 0.02 2.39 *** 0.10 0.65 286 0.00 0.00
Senior Unsecured 0.05 2.10 ** 0.51 1.09 1083 0.00 0.00
Senior Subordinated 0.09 2.28 ** -0.37 -0.39 496 0.00 0.00
Subordinated 0.10 2.20 ** 1.77 1.76 * 210 0.01 0.01
Junior Subordinated 0.05 2.10 ** 1.01 1.93 * 410 0.01 0.01
Unknown 0.01 1.58 0.41 2.24 ** 222 0.02 0.02
Re = ® + ¯F + "
In this table the one-factor model is tested on a sample of defaulted
bonds, measured in default time. Panel A consists of the estimated co-
e±cients before the default event and Panel B consists of the estimated
coe±cients after the default. The data is pooled for ten months before
default (Panel A) and ten months after default (Panel B). The market
beta (¯Market) uses the market factor of Fama & French (1992). The
t-statistics are calculated using robust standard errors. ***, **, and *
denotes signi¯cance on the 1, 2.5, and 5 percent level.
The tests for the priority ranked sample in Table 9 have similar results as the
entire sample in Table 8. The exception is that the market beta only is signi¯cant
for a few of the priority groups before default. The intercept seems to increase
with lower priority, indicating that the more insecure bonds are more mispriced at
default. The explained variation (R2 and ¹ R2) is still low, indicating that the risk,
as measured by the tested factors, has little to do with the returns post default.
I have tested the Fama & French (1992) factors and they are not signi¯cant after
default, con¯rming the general results in Table 8.
23The intercepts for the seniority groups are negatively correlated before and after
default. This is shown for the seniority grouped sample in Figure 2 below. The

































Fig. 2. Intercepts before and after default for seniority grouped sample.
negative correlation before and after default is valid for the entire sample, and to
a lesser degree for the industry and return ranked groups. The individual bond be-
fore default alphas regressed on corresponding after default alphas give a negative
coe±cient of -0.6. The alphas after default are on average positive, so either the
negative correlation is a sign of an over-shooting e®ect (mispricing) or there are
unknown risks that are not controlled for. To the extent that the risks in Table
8 and Table A.1 are controlled for the intercept is still signi¯cant and positive.
If the explanation is mispricing, then the size of the over-shooting is di®erent for
di®erent seniorities. The senior subordinated bonds has a low after default alpha,
and less certain categories have larger after default alphas. An economic interpre-
tation of this correlation is that junior bonds are hurt more than senior bonds by
the uncertain prospects before default. After default the junior bonds bene¯t more
from resolution of uncertainty.
5.2.3 Industry
The sample is divided into industry portfolios and test for market risk in Table 10
below. The idea is that the assets and leverages are similar within industries but
24di®er between industries. The industry sample should help to give an indication if
there are speci¯c industry risks that generate the results in Table 8.
Table 10. Return beta representation for industry ranked portfolios.
Panel A. Bond betas before default.
Priority Intercept ¯Market Obs. R2 ¹ R2
Oil&Gas -0.01 -0.91 0.08 0.21 25 0.00 0.00
Basic Material -0.02 -1.74 * 0.23 1.03 207 0.01 0.00
Industrials -0.02 -1.71 * 0.14 0.72 266 0.00 0.00
Consumer Goods -0.01 -1.70 * -0.03 -0.15 301 0.00 0.00
Health Care -0.01 -0.53 0.37 1.82 * 143 0.02 0.02
Consumer Services -0.02 -4.11 *** 0.44 4.15 *** 549 0.03 0.03
Telecommunications -0.04 -4.58 *** 0.58 3.16 *** 385 0.03 0.02
Utilities -0.02 -4.57 *** 0.12 1.26 358 0.00 0.00
Financial -0.08 -2.16 ** -1.25 -2.04 ** 26 0.14 0.10
Technology -0.06 -3.30 *** 0.26 0.67 127 0.00 0.00
Panel B. Bond betas after default.
Oil&Gas 0.02 1.68 * 0.76 1.37 40 0.04 0.02
Basic Material 0.06 2.33 *** 0.55 0.84 230 0.00 0.00
Industrials 0.04 2.68 *** -0.13 -0.41 285 0.00 0.00
Consumer Goods 0.04 1.02 -0.12 -0.10 311 0.00 0.00
Health Care 0.21 1.33 1.98 0.64 154 0.00 0.00
Consumer Services 0.02 3.81 *** 0.76 5.76 *** 650 0.05 0.05
Telecommunications 0.02 1.23 0.93 4.21 *** 412 0.04 0.04
Utilities 0.05 2.11 ** 0.17 0.38 456 0.00 0.00
Financial 0.48 1.29 -5.09 -0.66 40 0.01 0.00
Technology 0.08 2.28 ** 0.17 0.24 129 0.00 0.00
Re = ® + ¯F + "
In this table the one-factor model is tested on a sample of defaulted
bonds, measured in default time. Panel A consists of the estimated co-
e±cients before the default event and Panel B consists of the estimated
coe±cients after the default. The data is pooled for ten months before
default (Panel A) and ten months after default (Panel B). The market
beta (¯Market) uses the market factor of Fama & French (1992). The
t-statistics are calculated using robust standard errors. ***, **, and *
denotes signi¯cance on the 1, 2.5, and 5 percent level.
The pattern for intercepts and betas are similar to Table 8 and Table 9. How-
ever, the industry segmentation singles out two industries where the market risk
is important also after default (consumer services and telecommunications). In
an unreported test, the SMB and HML are signi¯cant at the 1 percent level for
the consumer services, and the SMB is signi¯cant on the 8 percent level for the
telecommunications industry. The other industries show the same pattern as found
earlier with limited explanatory value for the risk factors tested. The explanatory
25values are low, but slightly higher for the industries with higher market betas.
5.2.4 Return ranked portfolios
As an additional robustness test, the return ranked portfolios from Table 7 are
tested for market risk. The default and ranking months are not included in the
tests. The test against the market risk is presented in Table 11.
Table 11. Return beta representation for return ranked portfolios.
Panel A. Bond betas before default.
Priority Intercept ¯Market Obs. R2 ¹ R2
Portfolio 1 -0.03 -3.02 *** 0.61 2.50 *** 262 0.02 0.02
Portfolio 2 -0.04 -4.97 *** 0.10 0.63 249 0.00 0.00
Portfolio 3 -0.01 -1.61 0.08 0.60 244 0.00 0.00
Portfolio 4 -0.01 -0.82 0.32 2.06 ** 246 0.02 0.01
Portfolio 5 -0.03 -2.08 ** 0.35 1.19 213 0.01 0.00
Portfolio 6 -0.03 -2.51 *** 0.19 0.89 274 0.00 0.00
Portfolio 7 -0.01 -2.11 ** 0.11 0.71 180 0.00 0.00
Portfolio 8 -0.02 -3.27 *** -0.04 -0.35 196 0.00 0.00
Portfolio 9 -0.02 -2.39 *** 0.41 2.59 *** 261 0.03 0.02
Portfolio 10 -0.05 -4.24 *** 0.62 2.75 *** 262 0.03 0.02
Panel B. Bond betas after default.
Portfolio 1 0.13 1.17 0.67 0.31 217 0.00 0.00
Portfolio 2 0.05 4.36 *** 0.77 3.06 *** 252 0.04 0.03
Portfolio 3 0.03 3.54 *** 0.26 1.48 248 0.01 0.00
Portfolio 4 0.02 2.69 *** 0.96 4.53 *** 244 0.08 0.07
Portfolio 5 0.15 1.96 * -0.41 -0.27 229 0.00 0.00
Portfolio 6 0.03 0.58 0.03 0.02 241 0.00 0.00
Portfolio 7 0.01 2.36 *** 0.11 0.90 242 0.00 0.00
Portfolio 8 0.01 1.98 ** 0.21 1.39 252 0.01 0.00
Portfolio 9 0.03 2.92 *** 1.04 4.86 *** 252 0.09 0.08
Portfolio 10 0.01 0.91 0.77 2.41 *** 252 0.02 0.02
Re = ® + ¯F + "
In this table the one-factor model is tested on a sample of defaulted
bonds, measured in default time. Panel A consists of the estimated co-
e±cients before the default event and Panel B consists of the estimated
coe±cients after the default. The data is pooled for ten months before
default (Panel A) and ten months after default (Panel B). The market
beta (¯Market) uses the market factor of Fama & French (1992). The
t-statistics are calculated using robust standard errors. ***, **, and *
denotes signi¯cance on the 1, 2.5, and 5 percent level.
26The results for the intercepts and betas and their signi¯cance levels before the
default event are similar to the earlier tests (in Tables 8, 9, and 10). The intercepts
are, like in the other tests, positive and often signi¯cant.
5.3 Present value of recovery rates
The excess returns that follow the default event cannot be explained by the tested
risk factors (market risk, SMB, HML and seven di®erent liquidity factors). The
intercepts are signi¯cant and large (in the range of 0.01-0.13) after default. The
high returns and the low impact of the tested risk factors indicate that the recovery
rate might bee biased (too low) one month after default.
Another way of looking at the excess returns post default is to discount the future
recovery rates to the default date. If the present values deviate from the recovery
rate at default there is a bias. The question is how large the bias is, and if it
is economically signi¯cant. For this purpose, the recovery rate of market value
in column [1], the recovery rate of face value [3] and the present value of the
recovery rates of face value [4]-[11] are calculated during nine months after default
in Table 12. The average market beta is used to calculate discount rate. The market
beta increases from 0.24 to 0.63 between the ¯rst and second half of the sample.
This change in market beta means that the earlier discounted recovery rates are
discounted using a too low discount rate, but that later periods have a more correct
discount rate.
27Table 12. Risk adjusted discounted recovery rates.
Asset/Recovery rate Market Book
¿ +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7 +8 +9 Obs
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12]
Entire Sample 0.53 0.60 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.41 0.42 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.44 176
Senior Secured 0.59 0.74 0.61 0.62 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.65 0.66 0.67 17
Senior Unsecured 0.57 0.52 0.34 0.34 0.33 0.34 0.36 0.38 0.39 0.40 0.40 71
Senior Subordinated 0.46 0.45 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.28 0.30 0.30 0.31 0.31 0.31 33
Subordinated 0.60 0.42 0.19 0.23 0.19 0.20 0.22 0.22 0.26 0.31 0.31 11
Junior Subordinated 0.49 0.75 0.51 0.53 0.56 0.56 0.57 0.58 0.60 0.58 0.61 22
Unknown 0.61 0.79 0.63 0.64 0.64 0.70 0.70 0.75 0.74 0.79 0.85 14
Oil&Gas 0.71 0.47 0.37 0.36 0.35 0.37 0.37 0.35 0.39 0.44 0.46 3
Basic Material 0.38 0.51 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.28 0.30 0.31 0.32 0.31 0.33 15
Industrials 0.59 0.56 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.41 0.42 0.44 0.42 0.44 0.44 18
Consumer Goods 0.67 0.53 0.40 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.45 0.47 0.49 0.49 0.49 21
Health care 0.47 0.65 0.40 0.41 0.41 0.44 0.51 0.51 0.50 0.52 0.52 9
Consumer services 0.60 0.68 0.51 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.49 0.51 0.50 40
Telecomm. 0.49 0.39 0.19 0.23 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.23 0.27 0.26 24
Utilities 0.54 0.82 0.49 0.51 0.53 0.51 0.52 0.50 0.50 0.54 0.58 30
Financial 0.58 0.53 0.38 0.43 0.44 0.46 0.44 0.39 0.43 0.40 0.39 2
Technology 0.43 0.35 0.22 0.21 0.23 0.28 0.36 0.40 0.40 0.37 0.36 9
This table presents the net present value of the future book recovery rates, discounted using a






. RR¿ is the recovery rate at default
time ¿, Rf the risk free interest rate, n is the number of periods after default, ^ ¯ is the estimated
standardized covariance for the asset, and F is the market return.
The results in Table 12 are conclusive in the sense that recovery value increases as
the months go by [4]-[11] except for consumer services. For the entire sample the
average mean discounted recovery value nine months out [11] is four percentage
points higher than the recovery value one month after default [3]. The standard
method for calculating the recovery rate that uses one month after default seems
to underestimate the recovery value by ten percent. The cross-sectional variation
is there, both in terms of seniority and industry, but the result with increasing
recovery rate over time is robust. Investors that sell corporate bonds one month
after default receive, on average, a lower risk adjusted price for their bonds than
investors that wait. This could be expected since it is the same result found in
Section 5.2, even if the magnitude in terms of recovery rates was unknown.
In addition to the calculations for Table 12 I have done in-sample tests using the
28generalized method of moments method (GMM) from Hansen (1982). When there
are solutions to the moment conditions 11 the estimates do not deviate more than
a few points from the estimates in Table 12. I have applied the e±cient weighting
matrix. The use of GMM allows for calculations of t-statistics on the discounted
present value of the future recovery rates in parallel to the estimates in Table 12.
The estimates of discounted recovery rates are signi¯cantly di®erent from zero. In
the entire sample the default recovery rate is 0.38 and the nine month out recovery
rate is 0.42. The di®erence between the default recovery rate and the nine months
out present value of the recovery rate has a robust t-statistic of about 0.20 and is
not statistically signi¯cant.
The return tests in Table 8 through Table 11 measure the same e®ect as the test
of di®erence in recovery rates. The reason the former tests have signi¯cant results
and the latter test not is that they are based on many more observations. For
each 'entire sample' estimate of returns there are over two thousand observations
(Table 8) and for the discounted recovery rate there are only 176 (Table 12).
The excess simple return for the entire sample is 0.05 per month. The di®erence
between recovery rates (0.40 against 0.44) is only ten percent over nine months.
At ¯rst glance the monthly returns and the total di®erence in recovery rate seems
unreconcilable. The reason for this apparent discrepancy is that the probability
that an investor will receive the expected return or more is less than 50 percent. 12
Compounding over time means that the expected return is going to be higher than





























, where ^ RR and ^ ¯ are the estimated parame-
ters, i the bond, n the number of time periods the recovery rate is discounted, Rf the
risk free rate, ¸ the market risk factor, and Ri;k the bond return on bond i in period k.
12 Kritzman (2000) provides an intuitive explanation for this in chapter four \Why the
Expected Return Is Not to Be Expected".
296 Conclusions
The descriptive data on the cross-section for defaulted bonds aligns with previous
¯ndings on how defaulted bonds are priced. The ¯ndings in the post-default time-
series data are new. The claim on the bias in recovery rate estimations is validated
by the increases in the average discounted recovery rate.
My tests for excess returns in defaulted corporate bond returns give signi¯cant
excess returns. The explained variation in excess return is low with R2 values
approaching zero. The risks factors I use to explain the returns do not do a good
job, with the exception of the market risk. The other factors I have tested and
reported are the HML and SMB, and liquidity based factors. The market factor
in°uences the post default return for some portfolios (as can be seen in Table 9-11.)
The other factors give little help in explaining the returns. Perhaps most interesting
is the weak performance of the liquidity factors, since they are important for pricing
of corporate bonds in general. The return ranked portfolios are the ones most
in°uenced by the market risk factor post default.
The remaining excess return, when some risk factors are controlled for, is positive
and signi¯cant in my sample, and in the robustness checks (seniority and indus-
try). The dispersion of the returns increases after default, as can be (indirectly)
seen in Table 8. I can not ¯nd a suitable risk explanation for the positive inter-
cepts, so perhaps asymmetric information and investor specialization is the key to
understanding the apparent mispricing.
The holder of a defaulted bond cannot regain the loss that was incurred at default,
but there is no reason to abstain from the high unexplained returns following
default. The high excess returns could potentially spill over to bond prices before
default, but the size of the di®erence between at default and future discounted
recovery rates is small (ten percent), making this point mute.
307 Appendix
Table A.1. Return beta representation for the three-factor model and the liquidity factor.
Panel A. Bond betas before default.
Intercept -0.03 -8.34 *** -0.04 -6.80 *** -0.03 -8.77 *** -0.03 -8.44 *** -0.03 -8.61 ***
¯Market 0.29 3.91 *** 0.29 3.54 *** 0.29 3.51 *** 0.28 3.50 *** 0.30 3.61 ***
¯SMB 0.38 9.83 *** 0.39 10.62 *** 0.33 2.12 * 0.37 7.60 *** 0.45 7.02 ***





Obs. 2387 2387 2349 2330 2330
R2 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
¹ R2 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Panel B. Bond betas after default.
Intercept 0.05 3.64 *** 0.06 3.36 *** 0.05 3.63 *** 0.05 3.21 *** 0.06 3.63 ***
¯Market 0.55 4.40 *** 0.51 3.60 *** 0.51 3.74 *** 0.69 4.64 *** 0.58 3.96 ***
¯SMB 0.15 0.95 0.15 1.02 0.31 1.70 0.08 0.44 0.19 0.72





Obs. 2707 2707 2707 2395 2395
R2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
¹ R2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Re
¿;i = ® + ¯F¿;i + "¿;i
In this table the three-factor model is tested on a sample of defaulted bonds, measured in default
time. Panel A consists of the estimated coe±cients before the default event and Panel B consists of
the estimated coe±cients after the default. The data is pooled for ten months before default (Panel
A) and ten months after default (Panel B). The market, the SMB and HML betas (¯Market, ¯SMB,
¯HML) uses the market factor of Fama & French (1992). The liquidity measures are based on Amihud
(2002), P¶ astor & Stambaugh (2003) and Sadka (2006). The speci¯cations of the liquidity measures
are described in Section 2.4.1. The t-statistics are calculated using robust standard errors. ***, **,
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